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A decision-maker relies on information of parties affected by her de-
cision. These parties try to influence her decision by selective dis-
closure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition
between the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate
information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to
communicate. Our parties trade off their reporting cost against the
effect on the decision. Typically, they never reveal all information. A
better outcome may be implemented if the decision-maker adopts an
active stance by barring one party from reporting or through cheap
talk allowing coordination on a particular equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Decision-makers must frequently rely on the information of parties who are
affected by their decisions. Being interested, these parties will try to manipu-
late the decision-maker’s choice by, say, concealing facts or providing selective
information. One possibility to counteract such manipulations is to solicit
advice from parties with conflicting interests. Since any piece of information
favors one party or the other, competition between the parties constrains
their ability to selectively disclose facts; this allows more appropriate de-
cisions to be made.1 This literature typically assumes that the interested
parties incur no costs for making their reports.
By contrast, we look at the case where the interested parties bear a
cost to communicate their information: conveying the facts intelligibly takes
time and effort. Specifically, we consider the interaction between competitive
advocacy and reporting costs in a simple persuasion game. Two informed
parties (experts, litigants, managers) with opposed interests can influence a
decision-maker (adjudicator, judge, CEO). The principal must take a decision
in a bounded continuous action space. Her payoff from the decision depends
on the underlying state which is unknown to her: she wants to match the
true state as closely as possible. The parties are informed about the state.
They have conflicting preferences over the principal’s decision. They can
submit verifiable information disclosing the true state, thereby carrying the
decision. Nevertheless, they incur a reporting cost when they do so.2 The
informed parties, therefore, trade off their cost of reporting against the effect
on the principal’s decision. As a result, the principal will sometimes receive
1See Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Shin (1998), Gul and Pesendorfer (2012), Bhat-
tacharya and Mukherjee (2013), and Gentzkov and Kamenica (2015).
2Examples abound: The adjudicator may require a report in written form; in a trial
a party may have to testify in person in the courtroom. In both these cases there is an
implicit opportunity cost of preparing and disseminating the information. The cost may
also be an explicit one. In a products liability case/malpractice suit/financial dispute, the




Within this framework we study three different institutions. First, we
analyze unconstrained competition between the interested parties. The par-
ties simultaneously decide whether they disclose the true state or not. The
adjudicator is completely passive; once the parties have played, she updates
her beliefs and makes a decision. This benchmark set-up is motivated by the
adversarial procedure in civil litigation of common law countries.3 Moreover,
it is the framework usually discussed in the persuasion game literature on
advocacy.
In the next two institutions we endow the arbiter with more possibilities
to interfere. Inspired by the inquisitorial procedure of civil law countries, in
our second scenario the arbiter can bar one of the parties from the influence
game, say, by announcing beforehand that she will not hear the party or read
his report.4 In our set-up the principal cannot commit to a decision that is
not ex post optimal given her beliefs and the parties’ strategies at equilibrium.
Barring one sender creates, however, a crude form of commitment. It puts
the onus or burden of proof on the other party to provide information. If this
party opts to be silent, the sequentially rational decision will tend to favor
the barred sender.
The third institution for the principal to guide the persuasion game arises
when there are multiple equilibria, a distinct possibility with reporting costs.
At the start of the game, the principal may suggest how she will adjudicate
3Under the adversary system “it is for the parties to determine not only the issues
which the court is to decide, but also the material on which the decision will be based.
The evidence presented to the court will be that which the parties choose to present
and none other. The judge may not require that a particular witness be summoned to
give evidence or that a particular document be produced; he may not even question the
witnesses himself except for the purpose of clarifying some doubt as to the meaning of
what a witness has said under examination by counsel,” Jolowicz (2000, p. 28).
4Under the inquisitorial system “it is for the judge to examine the witnesses, if any, it
is for the judge to decide whether to summon the parties for interrogation and it is the
judge who acts to obtain the assistance of an expert when required,” Jolowicz (2000, p.
220). We thus analyze only one of the multiple instruments an inquisitorial judge has at
hand.
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if no party reports. Although these announcements are cheap talk, credible
statements can be believed and allow coordination on the outcome preferred
by the principal. Announcements may, therefore, be useful for shifting the
onus towards one of the parties.
Next we identify circumstances when “active adjudication” may be ben-
eficial in comparison to “passive adjudication” where the principal merely
updates her beliefs and makes a decision once the parties have played. Ac-
tive adjudication obviously has no useful role if the informed parties have
zero reporting costs. Indeed, without reporting costs competition between
opposed parties is not needed: the decision-maker’s skeptical posture induces
full revelation even from a single sender (Milgrom and Roberts (1986)). Nor is
active adjudication useful in the canonical persuasion game à la Shin (1998):
A decision-maker takes a binary decision. Two diametrically opposed senders
can communicate at no cost. Yet, with some probability they have nothing
to communicate which prevents complete unraveling of information. Bhat-
tacharya and Mukherjee (2013) extend Shin’s framework by endowing the
decision-maker with a continuous action space, resulting in a unique equi-
librium. The decision-maker gains nothing from being able to commit to a
default action in the case of no report. Furthermore, it is never advantageous
to bar one of the informed parties.
We show that these results need not hold with positive reporting costs.5
When communicating is costly, there are typically states of nature that are
not disclosed by the parties. Under passive adjudication, these undisclosed
states may be ex ante very likely. For example, when the arbiter has sym-
metrical and strictly unimodal priors over the state space and the informed
parties have identical reporting costs, there is a unique equilibrium with
undisclosed states concentrated in the middle of the probability distribu-
5Our analysis nests the persuasion game of Shin (1998) and Bhattacharya and Mukher-
jee (2013). Reporting costs are either zero or so high that it is never worthwhile to report.
Furthermore, reporting costs are the parties’ private information. This constellation is
strategically equivalent to the parties being informed or uninformed.
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tion. By barring one party and thus shifting the burden of proof on the
other party, the adjudicator moves the no-disclosure set to states which are
ex ante unlikely and, therefore, matter less for appropriate decision-making.
Alternatively, discarding one party may increase the probability that the
other party reports by an extent that more than offsets the loss from the
barred report. In general, in our set-up the adjudicator would do better if
she were able to commit ex ante to a decision given no report that is not
sequentially rational. Barring one sender or announcing a credible default
action through cheap talk allow for crude forms of commitment that may
help the adjudicator reach a better outcome.
It is well known from one-sender persuasion games that Milgrom’s (1981)
unraveling result depends on the assumption of costless disclosure.6 Other-
wise, the extant literature on reporting costs as such is scant.7 This contrasts
with the issue of costly acquisition of information on the part of the senders8
or with the literature on communication through costly signaling. Kartik
(2009) examines a one-sender communication problem, modeled as a signal-
ing game, where the sender can distort the facts by incurring a “lying cost”;
because the signal space is bounded, the sender does not reveal all informa-
tion at equilibrium. Emons and Fluet (2009) discuss a situation with two
opposed senders who can also falsify the evidence, showing that competition
reduces incentives to fabricate evidence as compared to a one-sender set-up.
In a closely related paper, Demougin and Fluet (2008) consider a multi-
stage litigation game where the judge ultimately takes a binary decision as in
Shin (1998), i.e., the judge must rule in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant.
They show that with small reporting costs the game generically has multiple
equilibria. During the procedure an active judge ensures coordination on his
6See Jovanovic (1982), Verrechia (1983), or Cheong and Kim (2004).
7Hay and Spier (1997) analyze the allocation of the burden of proof between plaintiff
and defendant from the point of view of minimizing litigation costs. Because each party’s
submission cost is less than the stake, the trial outcome is always without error. However,
litigation expenditures will differ depending on the burden of proof assignment.
8See, e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Gerardi and Yariv (2008), and Kim (2014).
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preferred equilibrium through cheap talk announcements which amount to
purposely shifting the burden of proof depending on the evidence submitted
so far. In the present paper, by contrast, multiple equilibria are not generic
because the principal’s action space is continuous. However, continuity of
the action space now raises the possibility that it may be better to bar a
party altogether.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents our basic set-up which, ab-
stracting from reporting costs, borrows much from Bhattacharya and Mukher-
jee (2013, 2014). Section 3 characterizes the equilibria under passive and
active adjudication. Section 4 discusses circumstances where active strate-
gies may be beneficial for the adjudicator. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Model
There are two informed parties, A and B, and an uninformed decision-maker
J who will be referred to as the adjudicator. The true state of the world
is x ∈ [0, 1] and is distributed according to the cdf F (x) with full support
on [0, 1]; f(x) denotes the probability density function. The adjudicator’s
priors, as defined by F , are her beliefs given the information available before
the informed parties take their actions.
The adjudicator must take an action y which yields her a payoff uJ(y, x)
that depends on the underlying state. For simplicity, y ∈ [0, 1]. The payoff
is expressed in terms of a symmetric loss function, uJ(y, x) = − v(|y − x|)
where v(0) = v′(0) = 0, v′ > 0 and v′′ > 0. The payoff is thus maximal when
the decision matches the true state.
The parties A and B are concerned about the adjudicator’s decision.
Party i ’s utility from the adjudicator’s decision is ui(y) with uA(y) = − y
and uB(y) = y. Party A wants the decision to be as small as possible,
equivalently as much to the left as possible; party B wants the decision to
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be as large or as much to the right as possible. Knowing the true state, they
may report x to the adjudicator: either they provide hard information about
the state or they communicate nothing.
Total payoff to an informed party is




0, if mi = ∅,
ci, if mi = x,
is the cost to the party of sending the message mi ∈ {x, ∅}; mi = x means
disclosure of the true state and mi = ∅ denotes silence. The cost of disclosure
depends on the party’s reporting cost ci.
9 Reporting costs are distributed
according to the joint distribution function G(cA, cB) with support belong-
ing to C = [c, c] × [c, c] where c > c ≥ 0. The marginal distributions are
denoted by GA(cA) and GB(cB) and satisfy GA(0) < 1, GB(0) < 1, meaning
that a party’s reporting cost is not always nil. G(cA, cB) is common knowl-
edge; when the distributions are degenerate, the parties’ reporting costs are
common knowledge.
3 Equilibrium Characterization
Let us now derive equilibria under passive and active adjudication. Our
adjudicator has no commitment power; her decision is always sequentially
rational given her beliefs. We first consider the benchmark where the adju-
dicator is completely passive. The parties simultaneously decide whether or
not to disclose the true state; once the parties have played, the adjudicator
updates her beliefs and makes a decision. This benchmark is motivated by
the adversarial procedure. Then we turn to active adjudication. We first in-
troduce a crude form of commitment on the part of the adjudicator: she can
9Reporting costs are thus constant, i.e., independent of the state. See, e.g., Verrecchia
(1982) for a discussion of reporting costs that increase the more the true state departs
from the mean.
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bar a party from reporting so that she deals only with one sender. A judge
has this possibility under the inquisitorial procedure. Finally, we exploit the
fact that the reporting games may have multiple equilibria; if this is the case,
the adjudicator can try to implement a particular equilibrium through cheap
talk.
3.1 Two-sender equilibrium with passive adjudicator
We describe the equilibria when reporting costs are private information; the
equilibria have a similar structure when costs are common knowledge. The
equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian (PBE). A strategy for the adjudicator
is a function y(mA,mB). Party i’s strategy is a function mi(x, ci), i = A,B.
The adjudicator’s best response is to choose y = x if one or both parties
disclose the state. If the state is not disclosed, her best response is
y∗ = arg max
y
E (uJ(y, x) | mA = mB = ∅) . (1)
The right-hand side is the adjudicator’s expected payoff from decision y given
her beliefs about x conditional on the event that both parties remain silent.
Party A wishes y to be as small as possible. When his reporting cost is cA,
it is therefore a dominant strategy for party A to remain silent when the true
state and his reporting cost satisfy x + cA ≥ y∗. To see this, observe that if
the state is revealed by the other party, disclosure by A does not change the
decision but imposes a reporting cost; conversely, if the state is not disclosed
by the other party, A is better off with the adjudicator’s default action y∗
than by reporting at cost cA and inducing the decision y = x. Similarly, and
recalling that B wishes y to be as large as possible, it is a dominant strategy
for party B to remain silent when the true state and his reporting cost satisfy
x− cB ≤ y∗.
Conversely, it is a dominant strategy for party A to report if x+ cA < y
∗
because A knows that, given the state x, the other party will not report.
Similarly, it is a dominant strategy for B to report if x − cB > y∗. Given
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the adjudicator’s default action when she gets no reports, the no-disclosure
event is therefore
N(y∗) = {(x, cA, cB) : y∗ − cA ≤ x ≤ y∗ + cB, x ∈ X, (cA, cB) ∈ C}. (2)
Condition (1) can be rewritten as
y∗ = arg max
y
E (uJ(y, x) | N(y∗)) . (3)
An equilibrium is completely characterized by a solution y∗ to (3).
Proposition 1: A PBE for the two-sender game with passive adjudicator









x, if x− cB > y∗,
∅, otherwise. (5)
The adjudicator’s strategy is
y(mA,mB) =
{










uJ(y, x)f(x) dx dG(cA, cB). (7)
Note that the right-hand side of (7) is not a conditional expectation.
However, condition (7) is equivalent to











E (uJ(y, x) | N(y∗)) .
8
Two additional observations are in order. First, as emphasized in the In-
troduction, there may be multiple equilibria; we provide examples in Section
4. Second, it is useful to make a distinction between an interior and a corner
equilibrium. An equilibrium is interior if both parties disclose with positive
probability. In a corner equilibrium only one party discloses with positive
probability, the other party is always silent. An outcome is referred to as
a corner-i equilibrium if only party i is active. Obviously, it could be that
reporting costs are always so high that both parties always remain silent. To
rule out this possibility, we assume cA + cB < 1 where cA and cB are the
lower bounds of G’s support.
Corollary 1: In the two-sender game with passive adjudicator, at least one
party discloses with positive probability.
In an equilibrium with y∗ as the adjudicator’s default action, both parties
remain silent for states in
S := [y∗ − cA, y∗ + cB] ∩ [0, 1].
We refer to S as the no-disclosure set. In an interior equilibrium, S is in
the interior of the state space as illustrated in Figure 1a. When party A’s
reporting cost equals the minimum cA, he discloses if x < y
∗ − cA. When
his cost cA is greater than cA, he discloses only for smaller values of the true
state, i.e., when x < y∗ − cA.
Figure 1b illustrates a corner-A equilibrium. The no-disclosure set is of
the form [y∗ − cA, 1]. Party B is always silent because x − cB < y∗ for all
x in the state space, which implies x − cB < y∗ for all cB in the support.
Condition (7) then reduces to






uJ(y, x)f(x) dx dGA(cA).
If in addition A’s cost is always cA, i.e., the distribution is degenerate, the
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condition further reduces to




uJ(y, x)f(x) dx. (8)
Condition (8) is equivalent to






























Fig. 1. Interior and corner equilibria
1
3.2 One-sender equilibrium
In the rest of this section we discuss two ways how the adjudicator may play
an active role in the communication game. First, as we show in the next sec-
tion, competition between the informed parties to influence the adjudicator
may not be desirable from her point of view. The adjudicator may prefer
not to be influenced by a party by refusing to listen to him. We modify the
game by adding an initial stage where the adjudicator announces whether
she listens to both parties or whether one party is barred from reporting
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(this would specify which one). In the latter case, the continuation game
that ensues is referred to as a one-sender game.
Proposition 2: A PBE for the one-sender game always exists. If only A is














uJ(y, x)f(x) dx dGA(cA). (10)














uJ(y, x)f(x) dx dGB(cB). (12)
In either case y∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Allowing only one party to report forces a corner equilibrium. When
only A is allowed, large values of x will never be reported but smaller values
(those satisfying x < y∗−cA) will be disclosed, at least with some probability.
Conversely, if B is the only one to report, small values of x will never be
disclosed.
Corollary 2: If the two-sender game has a corner-i equilibrium, then this
is an equilibrium of the one-sender game where only i is allowed to report.
The converse is not true.
There is a distinction between one-sender and two-sender corner equi-
libria. The outcome, by force a corner equilibrium, of the one-sender game
where only i can report need not be an equilibrium of the two-sender game.
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The reason is that competition between the informed parties may induce an
interior equilibrium or the opposite corner equilibrium. It is obviously not in
the adjudicator’s interest to prohibit both parties from reporting. The next
result parallels Corollary 1.
Corollary 3: There is at least one one-sender equilibrium where the allowed
party reports with positive probability.
3.3 Equilibria with announcements
Alternatively, the adjudicator can play an active role by trying to influence
the parties at the beginning of the game. Specifically, the adjudicator an-
nounces the decision she intends to make if she gets no report. Because the
adjudicator cannot commit to a particular course of action, such announce-
ments are cheap talk. They have no effect if they are not believed. Neverthe-
less, it is reasonable to assume that the parties believe credible statements
about planned behavior, the standard requirements for credibility being that
announcements are self-committing and self-signaling; see Farrell and Rabin
(1996). An announcement is self-committing if the adjudicator’s best move is
to follow suit if she thinks the announcement is believed. An announcement
is self-signaling if the adjudicator has no incentives to mislead; see Aumann,
(1990) and Baliga and Morris (2002).
Consider a particular equilibrium y∗ of either the two-sender or one-sender
games discussed so far. Let Y denote the set of possible equilibria. In the
modified game with announcements, we add a stage where the adjudicator
announces a default decision ȳ should there be no report. The announcement
is self-committing if ȳ ∈ Y ; that is, if the adjudicator thinks the announce-
ment is believed and the parties play accordingly, it is sequentially rational
for her to abide by ȳ. In addition, the announcement is self-signaling if the
adjudicator does not want the parties to believe she will play ȳ if she intends
to play otherwise. Let UJ(y
∗) denote the adjudicator’s ex ante expected pay-
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off under the continuation equilibrium y∗. Formally, UJ(y
∗) is the right-hand
side of (7), (10), or (12) evaluated at the equilibrium default decision y∗.
Proposition 3: ȳ = arg maxy∗∈Y UJ(y
∗) is an equilibrium announcement
and outcome satisfying the condition that credible announcements by the ad-
judicator are believed.
Announcements allow the adjudicator to induce coordination on the equi-
librium she prefers. Obviously, announcements have no effect if the equilib-
rium set of the continuation game is a singleton.
4 Active versus Passive Adjudication
Let us now discuss circumstances where the active instruments yield higher
payoff for the arbiter than passive adjudication. Before we start this discus-
sion note that if the best outcome among all potential outcomes is an interior
equilibrium, this can only be ensured through announcements, unless it arises
spontaneously as the unique equilibrium of the two-sender game. If the best
outcome is a corner equilibrium that is also an equilibrium of the two-sender
game, then it can be achieved through announcements in the two-sender set-
up or by allowing only the appropriate party to report. By contrast, if the
best outcome is the equilibrium of a one-sender game that is not an equilib-
rium in the two-sender set-up, then this outcome can only be implemented
by discarding one party.
4.1 Uninformed priors with known reporting costs
We start with a benchmark case where active adjudication provides no ben-
efit. In this benchmark, the adjudicator has completely “uninformed” priors
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about the true state, meaning F is uniform.10 The adjudicator has, however,
perfect knowledge of the informed parties’ reporting costs.
Proposition 4: When F is uniform and reporting costs are common knowl-
edge, the two-sender game (i) has a continuum of payoff equivalent equilibria
if cA = cB =: c and (ii) a unique corner-i equilibrium if ci < c−i, i,−i =


























Fig. 2. Equilibria with uniform priors
2
In Figure 2a we illustrate two equilibria for the case where both parties
have the same reporting cost c. Because the loss function v(|y − x|) is sym-
metric and all states are equally likely, any y∗ ∈ [c, 1 − c] is an equilibrium.
These equilibria yield the adjudicator the same payoff because, given her uni-
form priors, she is indifferent as to the location of the no-disclosure interval.
Figure 2b illustrates the corner-A equilibrium when cA < cB. y
∗ = 1 − cA
and the no-disclosure interval is [1 − 2cA, 1]. Barring A instead would force
10This is just Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason, according to which if there is
no reason to discriminate between several events, the best strategy is to consider them as
equally likely.
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the corner-B equilibrium y∗ = cB. This is detrimental because the no-
disclosure interval [0, 2cB] when only B reports is larger than in the corner-A
equilibrium.
When either of the conditions in Proposition 4 does not hold, there will
be situations where active adjudication may play a useful role.
4.2 Uninformed priors with unknown reporting costs
Let us now relax the condition that reporting costs are common knowledge.
Actively barring one party may now be beneficial even if this party has lower
expected reporting costs than the party allowed to report.
Consider the following example. A’s reporting cost is common knowledge
and equals cA. B’s cost is cB = 0 with probability GB(0) =: p; otherwise it
is cB = 1. With the high cost realization B thus does not report irrespective
of the state. The loss function is the square error v(|y − x|) = (y− x)2. The




−2(y∗ − x)f(x) dx+ (1− p)
1∫
(y∗−cA)+
−2(y∗ − x)f(x) dx = 0.
















where the right-hand side is the expected value conditional on no-disclosure.





1− p, if p < p0,
(
√
1− p− 1 + p)/p, if p ≥ p0,
where
p0 = (1− 2cA)/(1− cA)2.
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When p < p0, y
∗ > cA and we have an interior equilibrium where both parties
report with some probability. When p ≥ p0, y∗ ≤ cA and the outcome is a
corner-B equilibrium where only B reports.
mean square error at  = 0 is the same as in the one-sender game where only
 is allowed to report. Thus, when it is for the parties to decide whether
they report or not, the adjudicator is worse off than if he allows only 
except at very large values of  (specifically   0987). When both parties
are allowed, a larger value of  is detrimental to the adjudicator as long as 
remains in the interval yielding an interior equilibrium. The reason is that,
while a larger  makes it more likely that  discloses the true state, this is
more than offset by  being less likely to report. The detrimental interaction
disappears when  is large enough to yield the corner- equilibria. In the
limit, as  approaches unity, ∗ tends to zero and  always discloses, i.e.,
there is complete unraveling.









Fig. 3. Mean-square error in the two-sender game with uniform priors,
 = 2,  = 0 with probability  and is otherwise arbitrarily large
Informed priors. The adjudicator now has specific views concerning
the likely values of the state. Intuitively strong priors suggest that active
adjudication may be beneficial. Suppose  is strictly unimodal. If the
distribution is symmetric and the parties are known to have the same re-
porting cost , then the two-sender game has a unique interior equilibrium
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Figure 3 depicts the adjudicator’s expected loss (the mean square error)
as a funct on of p for cA = .2. When p = 0, B never discloses and the loss
is the same as in the one-sender game where only A is allowed to report.
A larger p decreases the default decision y∗: the more likely it is that B
has zero costs, the more “no report” suggests a small value of x. A lower
y∗, however, reduces the probability that A reports. It turns out that the
loss from this reduction more than offsets the gain from B’s higher reporting
probability. The adjudicator’s expected loss, therefore, increases in p for
p ≤ p0 = .937 where the equilibrium switches from interior to corner-B.
In the corner-B regime the expected loss is obviously decreasing in p. As
p approaches unity, y∗ tends to zero and B always discloses so that there
is complete unraveling. Straightforward computations yield that for p <
.987 the arbiter does better by actively barring B, thus forcing a corner-A
equilibrium rather than adjudicating passively and implementing an interior
16
or a corner-B equilibrium. Interestingly, this is not only the case when A’s
reporting cost is lower than B’s expected cost but also when it is higher.
4.3 Informed Priors
Consider now the case where the adjudicator has specific views concerning
the likely values of the state. Intuitively, strong priors suggest that active
adjudication may be beneficial. Suppose, for example, F is skewed with
most of the probability mass concentrated on small values of x. The two-
sender game may nevertheless have an interior equilibrium. If A’s reporting
cost is not too large, it may be beneficial to force a corner-A equilibrium by
barring B. Alternatively, suppose F is strictly unimodal. If the distribution
is symmetric and the parties have the same reporting cost c, the two-sender
game has a unique interior equilibrium with y∗ = 1/2. The no-disclosure
interval [1/2− c, 1/2 + c] is centered. Depending on the size of the reporting
cost and the precision of prior beliefs, the interval may include most of the
probability mass. It may be beneficial to force a corner equilibrium by barring
one party: no disclosure will then occur for values of the state that are a priori
unlikely. We now provide examples for both arguments.
The adjudicator’s priors are given by the Beta distribution B(a, b) with
parameters a > 0 and b > 0. The mean is given by µ = a/(a + b) and the
mode by m = (a − 1)/(a + b − 2) if a > 1 and b > 1; for a < 1 and b ≥ 1,
the density is everywhere decreasing so that m = 0. In all our examples,
the distribution is unimodal; it is either symmetric or skewed with mean and
mode less than or equal to 1/2. See Figure 4. The loss function is the square
error.
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Fig. 4. Some of the Beta distributions used in Table 1
p
In Table 1 the reporting costs are common knowledge. cA = .1 and
cB ∈ {.1, .15, .2}. The first case in Table 1 is B(.5, 1) with µ = 1/3 and
mode m = 0.11 When cA = cB = .1, the two-sender game has a unique
corner-B equilibrium with y∗ = .05. The adjudicator does, however, better
by barring B, thus forcing a corner-A equilibrium.12 When B’s cost is cB =
.15, the two-sender game has three equilibria: a corner-A, a corner-B, and
an interior equilibrium. The best outcome from the adjudicator’s point of
view is the corner-A equilibrium. This outcome can be ensured through an
announcement strategy within the two-sender game; alternatively it can be
implemented by discarding B. When B’s cost is cB = .20, the two-sender
game has a unique corner-A equilibrium. There is no need for the principal
to actively adjudicate.
Table 1 about here
11In Table 1 the type of equilibrium is denoted ca for corner-A, and cb for corner-B,
and in for interior.
12Due to the skewness of the distribution, the no-disclosure set of the corner-A equilib-
rium is about twice the size of the no-disclosure set of the corner-B equilibrium. Yet, the
no-disclosure states in the corner-A equilibrium are ex ante very unlikely as compared to
the corner-B equilibrium.
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For B(.5, 2), B(1, 5), and B(2, 5) a corner-A equilibrium is always the
best option for the adjudicator. The two-sender game never has a corner-A
equilibrium. Therefore, the adjudicator always has to bar B to enforce the
corner-A equilibrium.
Next consider the last two cases in Table 1 with symmetric distributions.
In all cases the two-sender game has a unique interior equilibrium which, with
one exception, is also best for the adjudicator. Only for the concentrated
distribution B(10, 10) and cB = .2 a corner-A equilibrium is better.
Qualitatively similar results hold when reporting costs are private infor-
mation. In Table 2 the parties’ costs are i.i.d and uniformly distributed over
{.05, .1, .15, .2}.
Table 2 about here
Finally, in Table 3 we provide examples where reporting costs are sym-
metric and small; the densities are concentrated and symmetric. For cA =
cB = .1, the interior equilibrium with y
∗ = 1/2 yields the minimum error.
Yet, for cA = cB = .02, the arbiter does better with a corner equilibrium.
Even though the no-disclosure set is larger than the no-disclosure set of the
interior equilibrium, silence is ex ante sufficiently unlikely in the corner equi-
libria as compared to the interior ones.13
Table 3 about here
4.4 Comparison with Full Commitment
The preceding results are driven by the fact that, except in particular cases,
the adjudicator does better if she is able to commit to some default action
13Note that in all our numerical examples the one-sender games always have unique
equilibria. However, it is straightforward to provide cases where even the one-sender set-
up yields multiple equilibria as well. An announcement strategy is then useful to allow
coordination on the equilibrium with the least likely no-disclosure set.
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in case of no report. Announcing self-committing default decisions or refus-
ing to hear a party are crude substitutes for the capacity to fully commit
to a decision that need not be sequentially rational given the adjudicator’s
posterior beliefs.
If the adjudicator has full commitment capacity, she announces the de-






uJ(ŷ, x)f(x) dx dG(cA, cB).
The parties’ strategies are as in Proposition 1 but with ŷ substituted for y∗.
If the problem has an interior solution, it satisfies the first-order condition
U
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with u′J(y, x) := ∂uJ(y, x)/∂y.
At an equilibrium without the ability to commit, i.e., ŷ = y∗, the first
term in (13) is equal to zero because it is the first-order condition for condition
(7). However, the sum of the last two terms will in general differ from zero,
implying that the adjudicator benefits from being able to commit to an action
that differs from the ex post optimal decision.
Moreover, a default action satisfying the first-order condition for a maxi-
mum under full commitment need not be a solution because the above prob-
lem is typically not concave. Consider, e.g., the case of uniform priors and
known costs of Proposition 4. At an equilibrium without commitment, when
both parties’ reporting costs are equal to c, the last two terms in (13) com-
puted at ŷ = y∗ reduce to
uJ(y
∗, y∗ + c)− uJ(y∗, y∗ − c) = 0.
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The equality follows from the symmetry of the loss function. However, as we
show in the next result, the adjudicator’s default action under full commit-
ment is a corner solution putting the burden of proof fully on one party.
Corollary 4: When F is uniform and reporting costs are common knowledge,
an adjudicator with full commitment capacity announces ŷ = 0 or ŷ = 1 if
cA = cB =: c and ŷ = 1 if cA < cB.
b)











Fig. 5. Expected loss as a function of b under full commitment with uniform
priors and known costs
5
Figure 5 illustrates the adjudicator’s expected loss as a function of the
default action. When both parties have the same reporting cost c, the equi-
librium y∗ without commitment is in the interval [c, 1− c]; the no-disclosure
set then has length 2c. When reporting is cheaper for A, the equilibrium
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is the corner-A equilibrium with y∗ = 1 − cA and the no-disclosure set has
length 2cA. In either case, the ability to commit reduces the no-disclosure
set by half.
An exception where commitment provides no benefit is when each party’s
reporting cost is either zero with some probability or otherwise takes values
greater or equal than unity. When the cost is zero, the adjudicator’s payoff in
the second or third term of (13) is uJ(ŷ, ŷ) = 0, so the term vanishes. When
the cost is large, the integrand in the last two terms is evaluated at z = 0 or
z = 1 so that dz/dŷ = 0 and the terms also vanish. This case is strategically
equivalent to the canonical game where each party can be either informed or
uninformed, as in Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013).
5 Concluding Remarks
We have discussed a simple set-up showing that a sophisticated uninformed
principal can often do better than merely wait passively for interested com-
peting parties to decide whether they will provide information. This holds
even though the decision-maker has limited power — she can force no one and
cannot really commit to anything — and even though she may be ignorant
of the interested parties’ opportunity costs in reporting information.
Our results do not mean, of course, that competition between interested
parties is not generally useful, as in the environments studied by Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) or recently by Gentzkov and Kamenica (2015). Nevertheless,
the analysis does show that reporting costs introduce a wedge between purely
passive adjudication and a more active stance. A decision-maker may wish
to make clear which interested party she will listen to. She may also gain by
announcing how she will decide if she hears nothing.
We have focused on parties with completely opposed interests. In many
situations advisers may, however, have overlapping agendas. Reporting costs
then introduce the possibility that advisers free-ride on the reports of others.
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An active stance on the part of the arbiter will often be beneficial, but the
issue now is to prevent free-riding. For instance, in our set-up, if both par-
ties have the same preferences and identical reporting costs, the equilibrium
will involve mixed strategies: some states are never disclosed, some states
are disclosed only with some probability which increases the more favorable
the state is to the informed parties. Barring one party altogether is then
unambiguously beneficial.
Finally, we have evaluated passive versus active adjudication solely on
the basis of error costs. A natural extension of our approach is to also take
reporting costs into account.14 If, for example, the arbiter gives a lot of
weight to submission and little weight to error costs, it may be optimal to
bar both parties from reporting.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let the parties’s strategies be as described in (4) and






f(x) dx dG(cA, cB).
Applying Bayes’ rule, the adjudicator’s expected payoff from decision y conditional
on no disclosure is therefore





uJ(y, x)f(x) dx dG(cA, cB)/Pr(N(y
∗)).
Maximizing this expression with respect to y is therefore equivalent to maximizing




u′J(y, x)f(x) dx dG(cA, cB) = 0
where u′J(y, x) := ∂uJ(y, x)/∂y. Sufficiency follows from u
′′







u′J(y, x)f(x) dx dG(cA, cB)
14See, e.g., Emons and Fluet (2009) for such a set-up.
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so that y is an equilibrium if Z(y) = 0. The function Z(y) is easily seen to be
continuous. Recall that u′J(y, x) > 0 if y < x and u
′
J(y, x) < 0 if y > x. Therefore,






u′J(0, x)f(x) dx dG(cA, cB) > 0.






u′J(1, x)f(x) dx dG(cA, cB) < 0.
Hence, there exists y ∈ (0, 1) such that Z(y) = 0. QED
Proof of Corollary 1. Let y∗ be the equilibrium decision under no disclosure. If
cA and cB are the lower bounds of reporting costs, A reveals with some probability
if x ∈ [0, y∗− cA) and B reveals with some probability if x ∈ (y∗+ cB, 1]. At least
one of these intervals is not empty. Suppose not. Then y∗−cA ≤ 0 and y∗+cB ≥ 1
yielding cA + cB ≥ 1, which contradicts cA + cB < 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the one-sender continuation game where only
A is allowed to report. A’s strategy is as described in (9) for some y∗. Using the
same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, the adjudicator’s best response











u′J(y, x)f(x) dx dGA(cA) (14)













u′J(1, x)f(x) dx dGA(cA) < 0
where the latter follows because GA(0) < 1. Hence, there exists y ∈ (0, 1) solving
Z(y) = 0. QED
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Proof of Corollary 2. The first part is obvious given Proposition 2. The second
part is illustrated by the examples of Section 4. QED
Proof of Corollary 3. In a one-sender game, if the allowed party never reports,
y∗ = µ where µ is the prior mean. When only A is allowed, he never reports
if µ − cA ≤ 0. When only B is allowed, he never reports if µ + cB ≥ 1. Both
inequalities together yield cA + cB ≥ 1, which contradicts cA + cB < 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 3. For ȳ, y∗ ∈ Y , let U(ȳ, y∗) be the adjudicator’s ex
ante expected payoff when she plans to play the default action ȳ but the informed






uJ(ȳ, x)f(x) dx dG(cA, cB).
Borrowing from Baliga and Morris (2002), the announcement ȳ is self-signaling if
U(ȳ, ȳ) ≥ U(ȳ, y∗), i.e., the adjudicator would like the informed parties to play
a best response to ȳ. By definition of an equilibrium in the continuation game,
U(y∗, y∗) ≥ U(ȳ, y∗). The announcement ȳ ∈ Y is, therefore, self-signaling (as well
as self-committing) if U(ȳ, ȳ) ≥ U(y∗, y∗) for all y∗ ∈ Y . Hence, the announcement
in the proposition satisfies the credibility conditions and is the one that will be
made by the adjudicator. QED
Proof of Proposition 4. When reporting costs are cA = cB = c, for any
y ∈ [c, 1− c] and given that f(x) = 1,∫ y+c
y−c
u′J(y, x)f(x) dx = −
∫ y
y−c
v′(y − x) dx+
∫ y+c
y
v′(x− y) dx = 0. (15)




uJ(y, x)f(x) dx = −2
∫ y
y−c
v(y − x) dx






v′(y − x) dx+ 2 [v(c)− v(0)]
= 2v(y − x)|yy−c + 2 [v(c)− v(0)]
= 0.
When reporting costs differ, by the same argument as in (15), an interior
equilibrium requires that y∗ be the mid-point of [y−cA, y+cB], which is impossible
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if cA < cB. The equilibrium is then a corner-A equilibrium where y
∗ is the mid-
point of [y∗−cA, 1], i.e., y∗ = 1−cA. This is indeed a corner-A equilibrium because
y∗+ cB = 1− cA + cB > 1. A similar argument shows that a corner-B equilibrium
does not exist. QED













v(ŷ − x) dx











J(ŷ) = −v′(ŷ) < 0 for ŷ 6= 0.
Hence ŷ = 0 maximizes the expected payoff for ŷ ∈ [0, 1− c]. By symmetry, ŷ = 1
is best for ŷ ∈ [c, 1]. In either case




Consider next the case cA < cB, so that cA < 1 − cB by cA + cB < 1. When




















′(1− ŷ) > 0 for ŷ 6= 1.
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J(ŷ) = −v′(ŷ) < 0 for ŷ 6= 0.





Because cA < cB, UJ(1) > UJ(0). QED
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Table 1. Square-error loss function and Beta priors
Beta One-sender A One-sender B Two-sender








(.5, 1) .10 .896 .037* .050 .077 .050 .077 cb










.20 .896 .037* .100 .438 .896 .037* ca
(.5, 2) .10 .790 .021* .046 .100 .046 .100 cb










.20 .790 .021* .087 .495 .087 .495 cb
(1, 5) .10 .500 .055* .077 .156 .077 .156 cb
.15 .500 .055* .102 .375 .168 .265 in
.20 .500 .055* .121 .645 .405 .088 in
(2, 5) .10 .562 .097* .148 .175 .207 .148 in
.15 .562 .097* .193 .492 .426 .145 in
.20 .562 .097* .225 .901 .519 .110 in
(5, 5) .10 .664 .188 .336 .188 .500 .148* in
.15 .664 .188 .412 .682 .621 .175* in
.20 .664 .188 .456 1.22 .654 .186* in
(10, 10) .10 .571 .296 .429 .296 .500 .189* in
.15 .570 .296 .472 1.07 .551 .256* in
.20 .570 .296* .490 1.48 .566 .370 in
Note: cA= .1; a star identifies the smallest MSE.
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Table 2. Unobservable reporting costs
Beta One-sender A One-sender B Two-sender







(.5, 2) .694 .104* .060 .217 .068 .219 in
(1, 2) .720 .188* .122 .272 .124 .234 in
(2, 5) .440 .539 .180 .411 .222 .367* in
(5, 5) .605 .548 .395 .548 .500 .375* in
Note: Costs are i.i.d and uniformly distributed over {.05, .1, .15, .2}.
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Table 3. Symmetric Beta priors and identical costs
Beta One-sender A One-sender B Two-sender







(10, 10) .10 .571 .29632 .429 .29632 .5 .18958* in
.05 .681 .02022* .319 .02022* .5 .02784 in
.02 .832 .00003* .168 .00003* .5 .00186 in
(20, 20) .10 .523 .31835 .477 .31835 .5 .10880* in
.05 .589 .04873 .411 04873 .5 .03731* in
.02 .730 .00009* .270 .00009* .5 .00262 in
(30, 30) .10 .511 .27992 .489 .27992 .5 .21277* in
.05 .554 .06710 .446 .06710 .5 .04319* in
.02 .668 .00031* .332 .00031* .5 .00319 in
Note: cA= cB= c; a star identifies the smallest MSE.
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